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A simulation is developed (System Performance Simulation,
or SPS) which models ship survivability under Surface-to-
surface missiles' (SSM) saturation attack. Using this
simulation, a plan of improving the weapon systems is
developed for current naval ships. The plan is used in a
stochastic model which predicts the results of the inner air
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Isolated and exposed on the open seas, surface fleets
in the 2 0th century have proved increasingly vulner-
able to a succession of ever more sophisticated
attacks from the air. 1
However, the dream of turning the medium size ship into
the master of the modern war is now approaching reality. By
means of advanced technologies and improved ship building
industries, increasingly sophisticated weapon systems are
installed on board the warships.
Unlike the battleships in World War II, the armor of the
current destroyers and frigates is less than one inch thick
and is not able to sustain several, or even one successful
air or surface attack. Any type of munitions, such as bombs
from an airplane or surface-to-surface missiles could cause
a disaster to the ship.
During the Falklands War in 1982, the British Frigate
Sheffield was sunk by an Exocet missile which was fired from
40 miles away. It is obvious that the missile technology is
now sophisticated enough to make ships more vulnerable, and
1Time, June 1, 1988, p. 23.
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the Sheffield incident confirms that it is difficult to harden
smaller surface ships to survive missile attacks.
The surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) could be fired from
the surface, the air and under water. The SSM platform could
be a ten thousand ton warship, a 50 ton fast attack missile-
craft(FAC), a specific aircraft, or submarines. Since the new
missiles are so accurate and powerful that they can cause
great damage, a FAC challenge to a big warship is becoming
possible. Unless the warship has a capable defense system,
the swarming SSMs from the FACs over the horizon will
eliminate their target completely.
For the navies of the third world nations, a modern fleet
is too expensive to maintain, but they still need a sea power
strong enough to protect themselves from their enemies. The
cheapest way to achieve this is to build a modern FAC force,
which could displace from 50 tons to 500 tons and be armed
with four or more SSMs and other weapons. If the effective
fire range of the SSMs is over 50 NMs and the enemy has no air
force superiority, these small forces would be hard to detect
by the enemy's warship. This means the SSM attack from the
FACs may well come as a surprise and the warship is at greater
risk than ever.
The USS Stark incident, which happened on May 17, 1987,
is another case of air-to-surface missiles (ASM) engagement.
The Stark did not activate its missile defenses and was
seriously damaged as a result of the attack of two
Aerospatiale AM39 Exocet ASMs launched by the Iraqi Dassault-
Breguet Mirage Fl fighters. Under normal circumstances, the
Stark weapon systems could have had an excellent chance of
defeating the ASM attack.
One scenario is drawn from the Stark incident. The
airplane, or the surface ship, launches SSMs and then
maneuvers away, so the target ship does not have a chance to
shoot down the airplane before the SSMs are fired. At this
time, the only thing the warship can do is to defend itself
from the inbound SSMs. The situation has then become what is
often called an inner air battle.
B. EQUIPPING THE WARSHIP
There are many countries that have ex-US Destroyers (DD)
,
Patrol Frigates (PF) , and other old ships, most of which are
undergoing renovations to prolong their lives and to improve
their sensors and weapon systems for future use. Some of
these countries are trying to replace their ex-US warships
with more capable medium size warships.
Whatever these countries are doing, the trend that seems
to lead all the navies is to build some type of ships which
have sophisticated sensors, modernized weapon systems and
advanced ship design. This type of warship is expected to
not only carry out multiple missions to save government
expense, but also to have increased survivability in combat.
Because the final attack is delivered by missiles, in the
Anti Air Warfare (AAW) area, the potential threat could come
from the air, the surface or subsurface platforms. With the
Stark incident in mind, the naval authorities would like to
know what survivability their current warships have when faced
with a sudden missile attack, and what would happen to the
survivability if the enemy launches a saturation attack? If
the ship's performance cannot satisfy the survivability
requirement, what enhancement of the AAW weapon systems is
needed? In other words, in order to improve the
survivability, which part of the weapon system can be improved
or what new weapon can be added to the original SAM (Surface
to Air Missile) system with the given budget?
C. ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DEFENSE COMPUTER SIMULATION.
As an aid in answering the questions raised above, a
System Performance Simulation (SPS2 ) has been created. SPS is
able to estimate ship survivability based on the weapon
systems on board, and indicate the way to improve the ship
survivability. It can also help to develop the tactics for
2Please see Appendix B for the computer program of SPS and
Appendix C for the output table.
the employment of defensive systems which have various
characteristics
.
The anti-air-warfare oriented SPS is a probabilistic event
store computer simulation of the interactions between a SAM
system and multiple surface to surface missiles. It was
developed as a Monte Carlo computer simulation which requires
a relatively large number of computer runs, and a certain
number of external calculations, but it uses only a relatively
modest amount of running time on an IBM AT type computer. The
basic operational modeling of the SSM/SAM( surface-to-air
missile) duel, the data required to characterize both
offensive and defensive systems performance and tactics, and
the computer implementation of the model as a simulation are
described in the next chapters.
II. SPS STRUCTURE
A. THE MISSILE ENGAGEMENT IN THE REAL WORLD
When the attacking platforms are approaching the target
ship, two conditions may appear: one is that the attacking
platforms are detected by the electronic warfare (EW) and the
radar systems of the target ship and are themselves attacked,
the other one is that the platforms fire at the target and
maneuver away without any problem. In the time the attacking
platforms are detected by the ship prior to firing their SSMs,
the target ship may be able to fire at them with long range
SAMs or SSMs. If the ship does not have the long range SAMs
to engage the attacking platforms, then the ship can activate
the EW system to interfere with the initial firing. The EW
system may have the chance to create a false ship image on the
attacking platforms' radar. This image could mislead the
SSMs. In such a situation, the target ship may have a higher
survivability. If the SSMs are fired from the attacking
platform without being jammed, in other words, if the
attacking platforms are not detected by the target ship before
the SSMs are fired, and provided that the sea condition is so
good that these SSMs could be detected by the ship's sensors
at some range, the ship must then engage them directly. The
engagement includes the AAW weapon system reaction event and
ship's maneuvering right after the SSMs are detected. The
number of defense layers depends on the weapon systems on the
ship. Generally speaking, the medium range defense relies on
SAMs. The medium caliber guns such as 76 mm or 5" gun, and
close in weapon system such as phalanx can take the close
range defense. The two layer defense systems mentioned above
is the "hardkill" . As for the "softkill" systems such as chaff
launchers, they could also help to mislead the attacking SSMs.
A number of factors can influence the ship's effective defense
in the real battle scenario, such as weather, sea condition,
sensors, EW system, effective intercept range of the weapon
on ship, degree of the air cover by the fighters, alert status
of the ship (e.g. general quarters), personnel's physical
condition and level of the personnel training. These factors
may bring different consequences.
B. PURPOSE OF THE SIMULATION
As mentioned earlier, the real SSM engagement is extremely
complicated because many factors are involved. Computer
simulation is able to simulate the operations of the real SSM
engagements with a detailed and extensive computer model.
The main objective of this simulation is more limited than
in the reality. It is to estimate the ship survivability in
a small saturation SSM attack. The deterministic assumptions
of the radar detection range, the effectiveness of sensors and
weapon system, the single shot kill probability (pk) value of
SAM and SSM, the sea condition, the personnel training level
etc. can therefore be used to simplify the computer simulation
model. With these simulation output data, the basic analysis
of the 12ship survivability can be obtained. The operation
of this model will be discussed in the following sections.
C. THE INTERACTION AREA
The geometry of the first scenario used in the SPS is
illustrated in Figure 1. The simulation is initiated by the
detection of four SSMs approaching the target ship
simultaneously. The defending SAM system includes a search
radar, two fire control radars (FCR) and one SAM launcher.
The inbound SSMs are assumed be detected at the ranges
30, 20, 15 or 10 NMs. As soon as the SSMs are detected, the
SAM system starts reacting. The reaction time from detection
to launch (given a load launcher) is assumed to be either 30
or 20 seconds. During the initial reaction time, the first SAM
is loaded, the system is relaying the detection signal to the
FCRs for lock-on of two of the intruders and the computer
system is computing the data which is needed to fire the SAM.
Then, the first SAM is launched at the first target which is
locked on by FCR1. Five seconds later the second SAM is loaded
and fired at the second target that is locked on by FCR2 . The
third SAM is loaded right after the second SAM has been fired.
After these two targets are intercepted by two SAMs, the SAM
8
system needs another eight seconds to assess the result of
the interception. If the kill has been confirmed, the SAM
system then starts the same steps on the remaining SSMs
.
Otherwise, it will immediately reattacks the survivor (s) of








Figure 1. Four inbound SSMs attacking a Frigate
10
D. BASIC NETWORK OF THE INTERACTION OF SSMs AND SAMs
The basic concept of simulating the interactions of SSM
and SAM is contained in a network, as shown in Figure 2. The
network is built of nodes which show the possible sequences
of events as the SAMs shoot down the SSMs in a series of
firings. If the first set of two firings shoots down two
SSMs, the second series will have only two targets. If the
first series fails, there will be four, and so on.
Since there are four incoming SSMs initially, the first
node is represented by "1234". The meanings of the other
nodes are as followed:
ii 34 ii. The first and second SSM are shot down; the
two FCRs are shifted to the third and the
fourth SSMs. The engagement is continuous.
"234": The first SSM is deleted; then FCR 1 is
shifted to the third SSM that is locked right
away. The second SSM survives the first SAM.
Hence FCR 2 keeps tracking the second SSM
while second SAM is fired at it.
"134": The SAM does not shoot down the first SSM. So
FCR 1 has to keep tracking it and another SAM
is fired after the assessment. (The assessment
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Figure 2. The network of SSMs and SAMs interaction
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"14": The first SSM survives SAM defense, but FCR 1
still keeps tracking it, and another SAM is
fired at it.
FCR 2 tracks the fourth SSM after the third
one is shot down.
"24": The second SSM leaks through SAM defense. So
another SAM is fired at it after the
assessment. FCR 1 is shifted to the fourth
SSM from the two deleted SSMs which are the
first and the third SSMs.
"1": The first SSM is the only one that survives.
FCR 1 still tracks this SSM and a SAM is fired
at it.
"2": It is the same situation as "1" except for the
SSM and the tracking FCR.
"3 and 4": The third SSM survives, but which FCR is
tracking it depends on which SSM is shot down
first in the earlier engagements.
E. EVENTS AND ROUTINES
1. Reload event:
Since the single missile launcher needs 5 seconds
reloading time to load the next SAM, the whole system is not
able to fire the next SAM unless the launcher is ready. So
whenever the target is locked on by the FCR, the SAM system
13
must check the missile launcher to see if the standby SAM is
ready on the launcher, and the time of firing of the SAM is
the time the SAM system and launcher system are both ready.
2. Intercept event:
Impact time and intercept distance will be calculated
in this event. When the SAMs are fired toward the inbound
SSMs, the equation of finding the impact time and intercept
distance is the following:
DTGT : the current distance from the SSM at detection.
T: the current clocktime at detection.
S
1
: speed of SAM.
S2 : speed of SSM.
Equation of the impact time (IT)
:
IT = [DTGT / (S 1 + S2)] + T
Equation of the impact distance (ID)
:
ID = (IT) X S2 .
In this event, it is necessary to check if the
intercept range is within the minimum intercept range, which
is 3 NMs. If the intercept range is within three NMs, none of
the SAMs can be fired from the ship, because the gyro of the
14
SAM would not stabilize to function well until the SAM has
flown a certain minimum distance.
3. Assessment event:
The assumed assessment time is eight seconds.
In this event, the SSMs ' position and time after the
assessment would be updated, and the uniformly distributed
random number is generated for deciding if the intercepted
SSM is eliminated or not, based on the pk assumed for the run.
4. Statistics routine:
After each iteration is completed, the SPS arrives at
the statistics routine, which will calculate and update the
expected number of SAMs fired, the expected number of SSMs
that have been shot down, the expected number of SSMs leaking
through the SAMs' defense and the ship survivability. These
calculations and updating procedures will repeat until the
last loop and last iteration is finished.
F. AAW DEFENSE SAM FIRING DOCTRINE
"In sea battle, defense is usually weaker." 3
In a hostile situation, more than one wave of attack from
the enemy is expected. Therefore, in terms of endurance, it
is not rational for a single ship to exhaust its missiles
'Htfayne P. Hughes, fleet tactics, p. 143.
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simply for countering the first wave of attack, and not
considering the ensuing attacks. For example, in the October
War of 1973, the Egyptian SSMs had approximately two times the
range of that of Israel's SSMs. The Israelis FACs were still
able to approach the Egyptians craft, inducing the Egyptians
to exhaust their missiles ineffectively. On the other hand,
it is too expensive to have a large number of missiles on
board. For these reasons, the optimal firing doctrine with
effective firepower is desired to apply , not only to decrease
the ship vulnerability, but also to save the number of SAM
missiles for the next expected engagement. That is one of
the important considerations during the AAW defense, hence
the different firing doctrines need to be considered in
different circumstances. "Shoot-look-shoot-shoot" and "shoot-
look-salvo" have higher probability to shoot down incoming
targets than the doctrine of "shoot-look-shoot". These
doctrines are worth using for the battle group or the task
group to secure the HVU (high value unit) . Albeit that some
SAMs could be wasted, it is possible for the ship to replenish
SAMs from a supply ship or other ships.
With the limited amount of SAMs and the other ammunition
on board, although "the defense is usually weaker", the sole
patrol frigate is still expected to survive of the first
several waves of air attack. In this case, due to the battle
16
life of a single ship, the mentioned doctrines are not able
to conserve SAMs for the ship. Instead of using the first two
firing doctrines, the "shoot-look-shoot" could be the optimal
firing doctrine in single ship defense. "Shoot-look-shoot"
is the firing doctrine that is able to continue firing the SAM
and assessing the result of the intercept until the target is
eliminated.
In SPS, the simplifying assumptions limit the number of
missiles fired to, perhaps, a maximum of seven . Therefore
it is not important to test, at each firing, for missile
availability. However, because of the need to conserve
missiles in larger engagements, the average number of missiles
fired in each run of the SPS is recorded.
17
III. SPS AND AAW DEFENSE PERFORMANCE
A. Accuracy of SPS
In the planning stage of this research the sample size
must be decided. While time and cost have to be taken into
account, the decision is based on how large an error we are
willing to tolerate in the estimate of a target ship
survivability. Since SPS is not a large model, it does not
take a long computer run time in an AT type computer.
Therefore, a maximum error of the ship survivability of 0.01
is able to be chosen in SPS. According to the maximum error
of 0.01, the sample size of SPS is determined by the
following:
N = number of iterations.
e = error, which is 0.01.
o = population variance.
a = 0.05, which is significance level = p(type 1 error) =
p(reject null hypothesis null hypothesis is true).
Z
a/2= critical value.
p = population proportion, which is the estimate ship
survivability in the model.
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The sample size with accuracy 0.01 is drawn from the
following formula4 :
N = ( Za/2 x a
2/ e )
2
Since the standard deviation of the parent binary
population is a = [p(l-p)] 0,5
,




2 / e) 2 = (Z
a/2 / e)
2
x p x (1-p)
Let the estimated ship survivability (SS) be 0.01, then the
sample is (when rounded up)
N = (1.96 / 0.01) 2 X 0.01 X (1 - 0.01) = 380.32
So that the estimated SS at different range are illustrated
in table I. The largest sample size is selected from the table
I, which can create the output data within 0.01 accuracy.
B. Defense firepower
The original AAW weapon system on board has two fire
4Jerry Banks and John S. Carson, II. "Discrete-event
system simulation", p. 427.
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Table I. SAMPLE SIZE IN TERMS OF THE ESTIMATED SHIP
SURVIVABILITY.
Est. SS 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.18
Sample size 381 753 2828 5421 5671
Est. SS 0.25 0.48 0.64 0.74
Sample size 7203 9589 8852 7392
control radars, one single rail launcher, 30 seconds reaction
time and 0.3 pk value of SAM. The assumptions of the ship's
AAW weapon systems and the engagement scenarie in Appendix A.
1. Maximum firepower (MFP)
During the engagement, an utmost performance of the
weapon system must be achieved to defend itself or defend the
task force from the attackers. The firepower is a basic way
to evaluate the weapon system's performance.
To make effective use of SAM-eguipped ships in
screening a convoy or task force from air attack
(either aircraft or missiles) , a method of
determining the effect of various ship disposi-
tions on the overall AAW-ASMD screen effective-
ness is necessary. One model that can be used
in determining effectiveness is called a fire-
power analyzer. This model simply determines
the number of shots (or salvos) a SAM ship can
get off at a given air target as a function of
the target's closest point of approach (CPA) to
the SAM ship. The number of shots that the SAM
ship can fire during the time the target is wi-
thin range is a function of maximum SAM range,
target speed , SAM speed, SAM refire rate and
20
the SAM ship firing doctrine. 5
One thing in SPS that is different from the above
description is that inbound targets are "home-all -the-way" toward
the ship instead of passing by the ship. There is no CPA that
relates to the ship. In this case, the maximum firepower is
the effective measurement to evaluate the system's utmost
performance. In other words, the maximum firepower is the
maximum number of SAMs that can be fired from the ship at the
given target detection range during the engaging time, i.e.,
once the incoming targets are detected by the ship's search
radar, the defense system starts reacting, the launcher
starts loading a SAM, the system computer begins to compute
the targets' future position that allows the FCRs to track and
to lock on the targets. When the first two targets are locked
on, two SAMs are fired in sequence. Due to the "shoot-look-
shoot" firing doctrine, two FCRs have to keep tracking the
targets until the kill assessment is made by the system.
To analyze the maximum firepower, the SAM's pk value
is always assumed to be 1, with which the analysis is able to
point out the number of SAMs that can be launched at the four
targets. For this reason, the FCR is automatically shifted
5 NAVAL OPERATIONS ANALYSIS, p. 228.
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to the next flying target after the assessment event, and the
engaging procedure is the same as before until the last target
is wiped out from the air, or the intercept range is equal or
less than the minimum intercept range. Note that "maximum"
in MFP is a reference to the fact that MFP is the maximum
number of SSMs that could ideally be destroyed if pk were one.
Later, firepower (FP) refers to the number of SAMs that could
be launched, hence FP can exceed MFP.
The maximum firepower of the current AAW weapon system
in operational scenario is shown in Figure 3.
The number of SAMs that can be fired at the SSMs is
directly proportional to the detection range. Hence when the
radar detection range decreases, the maximum firepower
decreases as well. Observe Figures 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, each
coordinate represents " (time, range) " . "M.I.R" represents the
minimum intercept range of the SAM. The line which is marked
as "FOUR ATTACKING SSMs" is the flight route of the inbound
SSMs. The start point of this line is the time and range,
when and where the target ship detects the four attacking
missiles. The end of this line is the time the ship is hit.
The line of "SAM1" represents the first SAM fired at one of
the SSMs from the coordinate of the X-axis. The coordinate
where the two lines meet is the impact point of the SAM and


















ORIGINAL AAW WEAPON SYYSTEM
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30
Figure 3. Maximum firepower of the original AAW weapon
system.
"M.I.R", the SAM cannot be fired effectively and would not be
counted into the maximum firepower.
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AAW OPERATION AND MAX FIREPOWER
RT=30 SECONDS, DETECT I ON RANGE=30 NMs
40 60 80 100 120
OPERATION TIME [SECOND)
Figure 4. The AAW operation and maximum firepower at 3
NMs detection range.
Impact point: "1"=(80, 16.67), "2"=(83 . 33 , 16.11),
"3"=(138.1, 6.9), "4"=(142, 6.33).


















AAW OPERATION AND MAX FIREPOWER
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RT=30 SECONDS, DETECT ION RANGE=25 NMs
40 60 80 100
OPERATION TIME ( SECOND]
Figure 5. The AAW operation and maximum firepower at 2 5
NMs detection range.
Impact point: ,, l n=(70 l 13.33), "2"=(73.33, 12.78),
"3"=(122, 4.67), "3"=(125.33, 4.11).




AAW OPERATION AND MAX FIREPOWER
RT=30 SECONDS, DETECT I ON RANGE=20 NMs
40 60
OPERATION TIME ( SECOND)
100 120
Figure 6. The AAW operation and maximum firepower at 20
NMs detection range.
Impact point: "1"=(60, 10), "2"=(63.33, 9.44),
"3"=(105.33, 2.44), "4"= ( 108 . 67 , 1.89).


















AAW OPERATION AND MAXIMUM FIREPOWER




Figure 7. The AAW operation and maximum firepower at 15
NMs detection range.
Impact point: "1"=(50, 6.67), "2"=(53.33, 6.11).














AAW OPERATION AND MAX FIREPOWER
RT=30 SECONDS, DETECT ION RANGE=10 NMs
2D 40
OPERATION TIME (SECOND)
Figure 8. The AAW operation and maximum firepower at 10
NMs detection range.
Impact point: "1"=(40, 3.33), "2"=(43.33, 2.78).
Maximum firepower is one.
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2. Analysis of the current AAW performance
Firepower is different from maximum firepower
because in the original system the pk value is less than 1.0
and hence different from the one in maximum firepower.
Therefore, the engaging scenario is no longer one SAM to each
SSM. It could be several SAMs vs. one SSM. The miss
probability of the SAM does not allow the system to shift its
FCRs away from the still surviving target, locked on by an FCR
to another target, which would take extra time to reengage the
surviving target. Thus the right way to do this is to keep
shooting the same target until it is shot down or the targets
are within the minimum intercept range. If there is only one
attacking target, the firepower would be high enough to give
a relatively high ship survivability. The survivability is
nearly zero as the adversary launches a four SSM saturation
attack. The reasons for that would include the pk of the SAM
and the system and the detection range. A discussion of the
relative importance of these factors will be found in the next
chapter.
The maximum firepower and the firepower of the
current system at each detection range is demonstrated in
table II. The interaction of the ship firepower and the
attacking SSMs is presented in Figure 9 in which the expected
leakers decrease as the firepower goes up.
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Table II. THE MAXIMUM FIREPOWER AND FIREPOWER.
10
Detection range (NMs)







* M.F.P: Maximum firepower.
F.P: Firepower.
I NTERACT ION
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Figure 9. Interaction of SAMs and SSMs
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IV. SPS WITH THE MODIFICATION PLAN
A. THE PLAN OF IMPROVING THE AAW WEAPON SYSTEM
Many nations that own ex-US warships cannot afford to
replace their current warships with more advanced ones because
of the limited budget. Thus the optimal plan will be
improving the current AAW weapon system in the most
inexpensive way possible to have ship survivability upgraded
at least to 0.15, 0.60 and 0.70 at the detection range of 20,
2 5 and 3 NMs . The improvement plan includes the software and
the mechanics of the weapon system. The former consists of
computer processing speed which is related to the system
reaction time, and the assessing speed. The latter comprises
launcher's loading speed, the speed and pk value of the SAM,
as well as the effective intercept range.
Since the performance of the mechanical part has been
designed to its fullest capacity, a simple small upgrading
change will be both costly and mechanically difficult. Take
the reloading time of the missile launcher for instance, it
is difficult to reduce it from the current five seconds to
three or two seconds. The job would entail extensive
mechanical overhaul and great expense without gaining much
advancement on the performance. As for increasing the speed
of the SAM, both the dynamic system and the material strength
of the SAM would have to be modified. The price tag for such
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modification could be very high. Finally, in order to expand
the intercept range of SAM, extra fuel capacity and an updated
gyrocompass would be added to prolong the maximum intercept
range and to lessen the minimum intercept range. This is also
expensive. Therefore the improvment plan shown in Figure 10
is preferred.
As Figure 10 shows, the inexpensive way in the plan is to
work on the software part. The first step is the modification
of the reaction time that can increase the maximum firepower
and firepower. The next step is the improvement of SAM's pk
value. Two states are involved in this step : upgrading the
pk value from 0.3 to 0.5, and from 0.5 to 0.7. As the pk
value hits 0.7, the cost of additional upgrading would become
unbearable. If the final performance of the system is still
unsatisfactory, then the third step should integrate the SAM
system with pk value 0.7 with close in weapon system (CIWS)
.
The CIWS is an independent system which has its own tracking
radar, data processing component and the ability of assessing
the intercept result. Details on CIWS will be discussed
later. The following sections will discuss the medium range
AAW defense performance which is the first line of defense for
the ship and introduction of the close in defense will be in
the next chapter.
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"*" in the flow represents the ship survivahili ty,
at ranges of 20, 25 and 30 NMs to achieve 0.15,
0.(3 and 0.73.
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Figure 10. The plan for improving the AAW performance
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In the improvement plan, there are five states defined
in the following table:
Table III THE DEFINITION OF EACH STATE.
state pk reaction time CIWS
1 0.3 30 NO
2 0.3 20 NO
3 0.5 20 NO
4 0.7 20 NO
5 0.7 20 YES
B. IMPROVING SYSTEM REACTION TIME
The alternative to increasing the survivability by
improving the pk is to expand the system's maximum firepower
which increases the number of shots that can be fired at an
attacking missile, and hence increases the probability of
hitting the targets. The limit of reaction time can be
extended to 20 seconds from 30 seconds. Figure 11 shows the
maximum firepower is doubled at the detection range 10 NMs
and 2 NMs when the reaction time reaches 20 seconds. The
firepower with 2 and 3 seconds reaction time at the pk
equals to 0.3, is demonstrated in Figure 12.
In Figure 12, the third curve representing "difference"
points out the tendencies of firepower differences between
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Figure 11. The comparison of the maximum firepowers.
the two reaction times. Between 10 NMs and 2 5 NMs of the
detection range, "difference" declines but goes up after 25
NMs. Evidently, the firepower is improved after the system
reaction time is reduced. Moreover, the "difference" curve
shows, as expected, that the smaller the detection range
is, the bigger the gap between 2 seconds and 3 seconds is
and the more the firepower will be.
However, such improvement will not change the ship
survivability too much because SAM's pk value is still too
small. Higher firepower has a higher probability to shoot down
one SSM, but in four SSMs situation, higher firepower with
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SHIP 'S F IREPOWER
D RT=30 SEC
DETECTION RANGE
+ RT=20 SEC © DIFFERENCE
Figure 12. The firepower after the second state.
lower SAM's pk value gives almost no chance of the target ship
surviving. This is shown in Figure 13. For example, at
detection range 2 NMs, the firepower is increased from 3.82
to 4.79 (Figure 12), but the survivability is not changed
(Figure 13) .
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Figure 13. Ship survivability at the first two states.
C. IMPROVING SAM'S PK VALUE FROM 0.3 TO 0.5
The SAMs in current use will have been in ready mode on
the launcher or stored in the magazine for a period of time.
Some parts of these missiles would have degenerated due to
the life distribution, which is the main determinant that
leads to the decline of the SAMs 1 pk value. Thus, a missile
that, when new had an effective pk of .5, may well have a
current pk of 0.3. But, since the pk includes such factors
as propulsion and guidence reliability, as well as warhead
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lethality it is possible that the pk of the SAM is constituted
by the following factors: the pk of the SAMs can be stored
after renovation.
When the pk of SAM is upgraded to 0.5, the weapon
system's performance has improved significantly. Figure 14
illustrates the interaction of the ship firepower and the
attacking SSMs in this state. The degree of this leaker's
decrease in the first three states is demonstrated in Figure
15. The mean value over the detection ranges of leaker
(E[ leaker]) at the fourth state is 2.19 which is improved 22%
from the second state and which is 3% better than of the
second improvement state.
The mean value of the expected firepower is 4.236, a 7%
saving from the second state, and has the 22% improvement in
decreasing the leaking targets as mentioned earlier. The
expected firepower of the first three states are exhibited in
Figure 16 and Figure 17 shows the ship survivability. The
mean value of the ship survivability is 0.054 which is 13.5
times the second, a big improvement from the last state, but
it still needs to be upgraded. The state of improving the
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Figure 15. The leakers in the first three states
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Figure 17. The ship survivability
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D. Improving pk value from 0.5 to 0.7
After two states of improvement, the performance of AAW
is upgraded to a level that still falls short of the expected
goal. So the upgrading process of the SAM's pk value has to
be continued in this state.
With SAM's pk value improved to 0.7, the interaction of
the SAMs and SSMs is more remarkable than ever. Demonstrated
in Figure 18, the mean value number of SAM fired is reduced
from 4.24 to 3.83 and the leakers are decreased from 2.19 to
1.71. The degree of the improvement in firepower is 9.5% and
of the leaker is 21.9%.
The improving rate of leakage in the fourth and the fifth
states is almost the same, but the firepower of the fourth
state is less than the third one. In a sense, the performance
of this state is more effective than before. As shown in
Figure 17 the ship survivability has a notable advancement in
this state because of the smaller leakage. The mean value of
the expected number of SSM killed by one SAM in this state
is 0.597, compared to 0.428 in the third state and 0.2 6 in the
second state. Thus the survivability in this state has a
bigger bound than before. The increased mean value of
survivability is 2.7 times that of the third state. From the
previous survivability analysis, there is an increase in the
predicted survivability for a detection range greater than 25
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Figure 18. The interaction in the first three states.
NMs when the pk and reaction time are improved. However, the
survivability remains zero within 25 NMs detection range. This
fact reveals that the improvements of the system reaction time
and the SAM's pk value do not affect the survivability for
short detection ranges.
In order to increase the survivability in the close
detection range, a close in weapon system has to be introduced
and installed on the ship.
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V. CLOSE-IN RANGE DEFENSE
A. THE CLOSE-IN WEAPON SYSTEM
Afer the CIWS is purchased and integrated with the present
improved AAW weapon system, the attacking SSMs would then have
to encounter double defense nets which provide a better
survivability. The characteristics of the CIWS 6 could enhance
AAW's performance. So the major consideration in deciding
which type of CIWS ought to be installed on the ship will
depend on its effective intercept range, system reaction time
and firing rate.
1. Operation of CIWS
Since the SAM's minimum effective intercept range is
three NMs, the CIWS must have a maximum intercept range close
to three NMs so that the second defensive action can be
executed immediately if the first defense fails. The assumed
CIWS ' s maximum and minimum intercept ranges are two NMs and
0.1 NMs. There will be a small gap of six seconds between the
two systems' operations.
When a leaker leaves the SAM's minimum effective
intercept range, which is three NMs, the CIWS mode is on and
Please see Appendix D for the characteristics of the
CIWS.
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takes over the defense responsibility. As long as the mode
is on, CIWS needs five seconds reaction time to process the
data and to lock-on. Next step after the reaction event is to
start its continuous firing at the leaker. The maximum
continuous firing time is eight seconds. After each continuous
firing event, CIWS must assess the intercepting result which
takes one second. If the engaged leaker is not shot down,
then the CIWS would reengage it for the rest of the time that
the intercept range still exceeds 0.1 NM.
In case SAM's assessment event is not finished until
the range of the leaker is within two NMs, the CIWS mode
cannot start its firing until SAM's system clarifies the
assessment. In such case, the CIWS cannot engage the leaker
with its full firepower. In other words, the time the leaker
can be engaged is not enough to create a good pk value.
The most significant factor to affect the CIWS •
s
defense is the pk value. This will be discussed in the
following paragraph.
2. pk of the CIWS
Unlike SAM, the pk value of CIWS is determined by the
number of the bullets that are fired at the target. The
longer the firing lasts, the higher pk is obtained. The
equation to produce the pk value in Figure 19 is demonstrated
in Table III. For instance, the maximum firing time of CIWS
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is eight seconds, which would generate 0.6 maximum pk value









Figure 19. The pk value of the CIWS.
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Table IV. THE EQUATION OF PREDICTING THE PK OF THE CIWS





** Unit of time: second.
PK = 0.075 X CFT
PK = 0.1 X CFT - 0.1
PK = 0.05 X CFT +0.2
B. INTEGRATED PERFORMANCE OF THE SAM SYSTEM AND CIWS
After the improved SAM system is linked up with CIWS, the
AAW performance of the ship is strengthened in the closer
range and the AAW defense capability is upgraded as a whole.
Figure 2 shows the expected number of leakers, and the
difference of the leakers in the latter two improvement
states, which are state four and state five. Represented by
the third curve, which displays the number of the deleted
leaker increases when the detection range is close to 10 NMs.
Within twenty NMs, the mean value of the expected
reduction in the number of leakers after the fourth
improvement state is 0.373, compared to 0.653 in this state.
The improvement is almost doubled. Figure 21 displays a























Figure 20. The expected leakers in the fourth and the
fifth states.
Furthermore, Figure 22 indicates the increased value of the
survivability from the fourth state.
In Figure 22, the curve which represents the increased
value of the survivability from the fourth state to the fifth
state is upgraded while the range is between 15 NMs and 25
NMs, but the curve is downgraded afterwards. A longer
detection range allows more time for firing more SAMs to
defend the targets in the medium defense line. This condition
will reduce the number of leakers. So CIWS in the longer
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Figure 21. The survivability of the last two states.
in the closer detection range. The fact exhibits the defense
capability in close range are improved.
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THE DEGREE OF ENHANCEMENT
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Figure 22. The upgraded degree of the survivability in
the last state.
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The most important thing in this improvement state is
that the result of the expected survivability values, 0.18,
0.65, and 0.75 at the 20 NMs, 25 NMs and 30 NMs of the
detection range meets the original expectation.
C. FINAL ANALYSIS OF THE AAW WEAPON SYSTEM'S PERFORMANCE
Four attacking SSMs were assumed to be fired from the
attacking platforms at the target ship simultaneously. This
means that there was no spacing time among these SSMs either
at detection or arrival at the target. The target ship's
defense capability before and after the improvement plan of
the AAW weapon system is illustrated in Figure 23 and 24.
These two figures demonstrate the expected number of leakers
and the expected number of SSM which are destroyed by SAM or
by the combination of SAM and CIWS. In system state five the
leakers are obviously far less than those in state one. The
ratio of the expected leakers to the total SSMs in the state
one is 0.727, and in the state five is 0.288. The ratio of
the expected leakers from state one to state five is shown in
Figure 25, from which it is apparent that fraction of
attacking missiles that penetrate the defenses decreases
significantly.
The ship survivability at each range is shown in Figure
26. Five legends in the bottom of this Figure represent the
increased survivability in each state, and the total stacked
52
bar is the final survivability at that range. A tendency
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Figure 23. AAW performance in state five.
the survivability ratio created by the SAM's defense increases
and that due to the CIWS decreases. And this tendency is
induced by the detection range, i.e., the expected firepower
is larger at a longer detection range than a closer detection
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Figure 24. AAW performance in state one.
SSMs at the longer detection range. The chance to destroy the
SSMs in this condition should then be greater, which is able
to generate a higher ship survivability. The expected number
of leakers would then be less which would lessen the burden
on the close-in defense. This is the main factor which
reduces the ship survivability ratio created by CIWS at the
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longer range. The CIWS * s performance in terms of the
detection range is shown in Figure 27. The ship survivability
at the detection range of 2 NMs is 0.18, which makes it seem
that the achievement is completed by the CIWS alone as shown
in Figure 26. Actually, the expected number of killed SSMs
before they enter the close-in line defense is 2.21, i.e.,
the expected number of leakers is 1.79, which will meet the
CIWS and the expected leakers will then be reduced to 1.14.
That is what gives the ship 0.18 survivability.
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Figure 27. Expected number of SSMs killed by the CIWS at
each detection range.
57
D. SEQUENTIAL ATTACKING SSMs SCENARIO
Up to this point the four SSMs are assumed to attack the
target ship simultaneously. In this section, ship survival
when the SSM attack sequentially will be discussed.
To the target ship, the sequential attacking SSMs
scenario will give the AAW weapon systems extra time to fire
more SAMs at the SSM. The increased firepower is able to
create a better survivability than when the attack is
simultaneous. The greater the spacing time between two of
the SSMs, the higher survivability should be. Figure 28
presents the survivability of the sequential attacking SSMs
in which the average spacing of the four curves are assumed
to be zero, five, ten and fifteen seconds respectively. The
spacing time has a greater influence on survivability when
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The objectives of this research were to investigate an
AAW weapon systems improvement plan designed to enhance ship
survivability. The modeling assumptions and data base are
integrated into a stochastic computer code which predicts the
ship survivability. The goal of this model is to predict
ship survivability at each successive stage ("state") of the
AAW weapon systems improvement plan, and to order the states
of improvement by increasing cost.
In this plan, the improvements are focused on increasing
the maximum firepower, improving the SAM's pk value and adding
CIWS. The ship survivability was upgraded to the specified
value after these improvements were completed. Based on the
ship survivability in a saturation attack by four SSMs, the
current AAW weapon systems would be useful in defending
against only one or two inbound SSMs.
For future use, all the weapon systems on board should
be taken into account in the model, such as five inch, 7 6 mm
and 40 mm gun(s), EW and the chaff system. In addition to
the weapon systems, weather and sea condition, sensor
reliability and personnel's condition ought to be considered
as well. In this situation, so many variables would have to
be added into the simulation model that the model would be
greatly expanded and more complicated. The increased model
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costs in model development and application generate a need to
consider the trade-off between the study costs and the
expected improvement in the quality of decision making that
might result. However, the present study addresses the major
factors needed for a reasonable initial assessment.
This research has not provided the "final answer" to the
questions involved in naval programs for "modernizing the
aging warship." In fact, it has simply proposed a
methodology, a method with which to attack the problem.
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Appendix A
Assumptions of the SPS
There are four low altitude incoming targets.
The target spacing is zero (arrives almost
simultaneously)
.
The radar detection ranges are 30, 25, 20, 15, 10 NMs
The reaction time from target detection to missile
launched is assumed to be 2 and 3 seconds.
The minimum intercept range of SAM is three NMs, the
maximum intercept range is 3 NMs.
The single missile kill probabilities are assumed to
be . 3 , 0.5 and 0.7.
The engagement doctrine is shoot-look-shoot and the
missile is home-all-the-way
.
The missile launch cycle time is 5 seconds and the
target kill assessment time is 8 seconds,
the missile's average speed is 20 NMs/Min and the
target's speed is 10 NMs/Min.
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Appendix B
The program of SPS
CLS
OPTION BASE 1
DIM SS(5,10,30) ,EK(5, 10,30) , NS (5, 10,30) , RA ( 1000)
DIM SA(5,10,30) ,TM(5,10,30)
DIM LEAKTHRU(5,10,30) , ESI (5 , 10 , 30) , ESA (5 , 10 , 3 0) ,RM(10,50)
DIM BG(5,10,30)
INPUT "SEED =";SEED
PRINT I,SEED= 1 ' ;SEED
IF SEED > THEN SEED=-SEED
X=RND(SEED)
TIME$= ,f 00:00:00"
Sl=l/3 • S2: speed of SAM
S2=l/6 ' SI: speed of TGT
SZ=9589
INPUT nSPACING="; SPACING ' THE SPACING TIME BETWEEN THE
1 TGTs
SEQ=SPACING ' SAME AS SPACING FOR SUBSTITUTION.
CIWSRT=5 ' CIWS REACTION TIME IS 5 SEC.








640 IF RT<20 THEN GOTO 1220
J=J+1 : K=0 : RM ( I , J) =RT
RT1=RT:RANGE=3
680 IF RANGE<10 THEN GOTO 1180
K=K+1 : TOTALT=RANGE*6
RA(K)=RANGE












800: IF N>SZ THEN GOTO 1070 'N IS SAMPLE SIZE
T=0 : TP=0 : TGTK=0 : M=0 : L=0 : MARK=0 : OK=4 : TGT1SUC=0 : TGT2 SUC=0 : AR=0
RL=1 'RL IS RELOAD NUMBER
TT=6*RANGE 'TT IS TOTAL TIME
TC=6*(RANGE-3) TC IS CRITICAL TIME
TGT1SAM=0: TGT2SAM=0: TGT3SAM=0: TGT4SAM=0







IF TGT1=0 THEN TGTK=TGTK+1: OK=OK-l
IF TGT2=0 THEN TGTK=TGTK+1: OK=OK-l
IF TGT3=0 THEN TGTK=TGTK+1: OK=OK-l
IF TGT4=0 THEN TGTK=TGTK+1: OK=OK-l
TLEAK=TLEAK+OK
IF OK=0 THEN SUCCESS=SUCCESS+1 : NOLEAK=NOLEAK+l
•NOLEAK: THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE BY SAM




IF OK > THEN HIT =HIT+1
IF OK = THEN SUCCESS=SUCCESS+1
TGTKBYMAC =4-OK











1270 PK=PK- . 2 : GOTO 610
1280:
LPRINT"RT : REACTION TIME .
"
LPRINT"RANGE: DETECTION RANGE."
LPRINT"NSAM:THE # OF THE SAM FIRED."
LPRINT"E(NS) : EXPECTED # OF THE SAM FIRED."
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LPRINT"V: THE # OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE SHIP."
LPRINT"E(V) : EXPECTED VALUE OF V, WHICH IS THE SURVIVALBILITY
OF THE SHIP"
LPRINT" IN SAM MODE."
LPRINT" BINGO: THE # OF THE TGTS ARE DISTROYED BY SAM."
LPRINT" EK (SAM) : EXPECTED # OF THE TGTS ARE DESTROYED BY SAM."
LPRINT"HIT: THE EXPECTED # OF THE SHIP IS HIT BY AT LEAST 1
INBOUND TGTS"
LPRINT" LEAK: THE # OF THE TGTS LEAKING THROUGHT THE SAM
DEFENSE."
LPRINT"E(L): EXPECPTED VALUE OF THE LEAKING TGTS."
LPRINT"CIWS: # OF TGTS KILLED BY CIWS"
LPRINT"EK(S&C) : EXSPECTED # OF THE TGTs DESTROYED BY SAM AND
CIWS .
"
LPRINT" PENETRATOR: THE EXPECTED # OF TGTS HIT THE SHIP
SUCCESSFULLY"




RT RANGE NSAM E(NS) V
E(L) EK EK PENET- SS"
CIWS S&C RATOR "
E(V) BINGO EK HIT LEAK
SAM SAM (L)
A$= »## ## ###### #.## ##### #.## ###### #.## #.## ######
#.## #.## #.## #.## #.##"
B$= "\ \#.#"
C$="PK="
FOR 1=1 TO 3
LPRINT USING B$;C$,QQ(I)
FOR J=l TO 2











•TOTAL SAM THE SHIP HAS FIRED
'EXPECTED # OF THE SAM HAVE BEEN FIRED
'THE # OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE
'SHIP
'THE EXPECTED # OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE
'OF THE SHIP
•THE # OF THE DESTROYED TGTs BY SAM
'THE EXPECTED # OF THE DESTROYED TGTs
•BY SAM
LL=DEFFAIL(I,J,K)/N 'EXPECTED # OF AT LEAST ONE TGTs
•IMPACT THE SHIP
•IF THERE IS NO CIWS
MM=LEAKTHRU ( I , J,K) 'THE # OF THE TGTs GET THRU THE
'SAM'S DEFENSE
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NN=ESI(I,J,K) 'THE EXPECTED # OF THE TGTs GET
'THRU THE SAM'S
•DEFENSE
00=CIWSKILL(I,J,K) 'THE # OF THE TGTs ARE KILLED BY
'THE CIWS
PP=TOTALEK(I,J,K) 'THE FINAL EK (TGTs ARE DEFENDED
'BY SAM AND CIWS)
QQ=(MM-BYCIWS(I,J,K) ) /N 'THE TGTs IMPACT THE SHIP
' SUCCESSFULLY
RR=SS(I,J,K) 'THE SHIP'S SURVIVALBILITY
•SA(I,J,K): SUCCESS. ESI (I, J , K) : EXPECT # TGT GETTING
' THRU
.






14 00 REM RELOAD:
IF NFROM=12 34 AND WHERE=12 34 THEN
IF TP-T<1 THEN TP=T+1
GOTO 1460
END IF
IF NFROM=12 3 4 AND WHERE=3 4 THEN
•TP=T-4 THE EXACT TIME FOLLOWING TGT3 FOR SPACING
•4 SEC WHEN FCR1
FIRES SAM AT TGT3 . SAM START RELOADING RIGHT
'AFTER THIS INCIDENT AT TP.
IF TP-T<1 THEN TP=T+1 ELSE TP=TP+0
GOTO 14 60
END IF
IF NFROM=2 3 4 AND WHERE=34 THEN
IF TP-T>1 THEN TP=TP+0 : T=T+0
GOTO 14 60
END IF
IF NFROM=134 AND WHERE=34 THEN




IF NFROM=2 3 4 AND (WHERE=2 4 OR WHERE=4 ) THEN GOTO
IF NFROM=34 AND (WHERE=3 OR WHERE=4) THEN GOTO 1460
IF NFROM=34 AND NFROM=3 4 THEN
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IF TP-T<1 THEN TP=T+1
GOTO 1460
END IF
IF NFROM=134 AND (WHERE=14 OR WHERE=4 ) THEN GOTO
1460
IF NFROM=234 AND WHERE=234 THEN GOTO 1460
IF NFROM=134 AND WHERE=134 THEN GOTO 14 60
14 60 RETURN
1470 REM MEET2:
'FIRST BLOCK IS ENGAGING THE








TP=TP+ ( DTGTP/ ( S 1+S 2 )
)
DTGTP=RANGE- ( TP/ 6






FLAG=1 : NSAM1=NSAM1-1 : NSAM2=NSAM2-1 : RETURN
END IF
<= 3 AND DTGTP > 3

















T=T+8 : DTGT=RANGE- (T/6)
TP=TP+8 : DTGTP=RANGE- (TP/6)
CIWSDTGT=DTGT : CIWSDTGTP=DTGTP
CIWST=T:CIWSTP=TP ' CIWST AND CIWSTP ARE THE CIWS
'MODE
IF DTGT <= 3 AND DTGTP <= 3
IF TGT1SUC=1 AND DTGTP <= 3
IF TGT2SUC=1 AND DTGT <= 3











T=T+8 : DTGT=RANGE- (T/6) : CIWST=T : CIWSDTGT=DTGT
IF R =< PK THEN TGT=0
IF DTGT <= 3 THEN FLAG=1
2 010 RETURN
2210 'S1234: (FCR1 LOCK-ON TGT1,
REACTION TIME.)





•IF FLAG=1 THEN SAM'S DEFENSE IS ENDED
'IF CIWSFLAG=1 THEN CIWS MODE IS ON,
' WHICH IMPLY THERE
'ARE TGTs LEAKING THRU THE SAM'S DEFENSE
KUM=0 'KUM IS THE CODE FOR 1234-134-34-3
'USE ONLY













GOSUB 1470: TGT1SAM=NSAMI : TGT2SAM=NSAM2 IF FLAG=1
THEN RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK=1: GOSUB 184 :TGT1=TGT: GOSUB 4 380: RETURN
END IF
GOSUB 1690: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT1=TGTA : TGT2=TGTB
IF TGT1=1 AND TGT2=1 THEN
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT2=0 THEN
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT2=1 THEN






2400 'S34: (SUBROUTINE FOR TGT1 AND TGT2 HAVE BEEN KILLED BUT
NOT TGT3 AND TGT4)
FLAG=0: WHERE=3 4


















IF NFROM=12 3 4 THEN T=T+RT : TP=TP+RT: GOSUB 14 00
IF NFROM=2 34 THEN TP=TP+RT: GOSUB 14 00






GOSUB 1470 :TGT3SAM=NSAM1 :TGT4SAM=NSAM2 : IF FLAG=1 THEN
RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK=1: GOSUB 184 :TGT3=TGT:
END IF
GOSUB 1690: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT2SUC=1 AND TGT1SUC=0 THEN
GOSUB 3 8 60: RETURN
TGT3=TGTA: GOSUB




3 58 0: RETURN
TGT3=TGTA : TGT4=TGTB
IF TGT3=1 AND TGT4=1 THEN GOSUB 14 00: GOTO 2 54
IF TGT3=0 AND TGT4=0 THEN RETURN
IF TGT3=0 AND TGT4=0 THEN RETURN
IF TGT3=0 AND TGT4=1 THEN GOSUB 3580
IF TGT3=1 AND TGT4=0 THEN GOSUB 3860
RETURN
2 74 5 'S2 34: (SUBROUTINE FOR TGT1 HAS BEEN KILLED BUT NOT
• TGT2,TGT3 AND TGT4
)
' NOTE:
' 1. FCR1 MOVE TO TGT3 , AND FCR2 IS STILL ON TGT2
1 2. IN THIS CASE, FCR1 NEED REACTION BECAUSE OF
1 ENGAGING NEW TGT















MARK=l:GOSUB 184 :TGT2=TGT: GOSUB 4200:RETURN
END IF
GOSUB 1690: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT2=TGTA : TGT3=TGTB
IF TGT2=1 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOTO 2850
IF TGT2=0 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 3580
IF TGT2=0 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOSUB 2400
IF TGT2=1 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 3 340
3 070 RETURN
3075 'S134: (SUBROUTINE FOR TGT2 HAS BEEN KILLED BUT NOT TGT1,
' AND TGT3,TGT4 STILL EXIST)
NOTE:
1. BECAUSE TGT1 HAS NOT BEEN KILLED, SO IT NEEDS
TO FIRE SAM TOWARD
TGT1 AND NO REACTION TIME NECESSARY.
2. FCR2 KILLED TGT2 AND SHIFT TO NEXT TGT WHICH IS
TGT3, SO IT NEED
TO ADD REACTION TIME FOR LOCKING ON THE TGT.
IF FLAG=1 THEN









3240 GOSUB 1470 : TGT1SAM=NSAM1 : TGT3SAM=NSAM2
RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK=1: GOSUB 184 : TGT1=TGT: GOSUB 3 580: RETURN
END IF
NFROM=134: GOSUB 1690: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT1=TGTA : TGT3=TGTB
IF TGT1=1 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOTO 3200
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 3580
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT3=1 THEN GOSUB 2400
IF TGT1=1 AND TGT3=0 THEN GOSUB 4550
3330 RETURN
70
3335 'S24:(TGT2 AND TGT4 LEFT, BUT FCR1 SHIFTS FROM TGT3 TO
'TGT4 SO FCR1 NEEDS THE REACTION TIME TO LOCK ON TGT4
.
)
FLAG=0:WHERE=24: 'PRINT "IN 24"










GOSUB 1470:TGT2SAM=NSAM1:TGT4SAM=NSAM2:IF FLAG=1 THEN
RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK=l:GOSUB 184 : TGT1=TGT: GOSUB 4200:RETURN
END IF







IF TGT2=1 AND TGT4=1
IF TGT2=1 AND TGT4=0
IF TGT2=0 AND TGT4=1
IF TGT2=0 AND TGT4=0
IF TGT2=0 AND TGT4=0
3 57 RETURN









1. CASE 1: WHICH FROM NODE 234 IS TO KILL TGT2 AND
TGT3, THEN SHIFT THE FCR, WHICH WE SHOULD CHOOSE
MIN(T,TP) OF THE FCR TO TGT4
.
2. CASE 2: WHICH FROM NODE 134 IS TO KILL TGT1 AND
TGT3, THEN SHIFT THE FCR, WHICH WE SHOULD CHOOSE
MIN(T,TP) OF THE FCR, TO TGT4
3. IN THESE TWO CASES, IT NEEDS TO ADD THE REACTION










IF NFROM=3 4 THEN T=TP: GOTO 3730
IF T >= TP THEN T=TP
IF NFROM=2 3 4 THEN T=T-2*SPACING+RT
71
IF NFROM=134 THEN T=T-3*SPACING+RT
374 TGT4SAM=TGT4SAM+1
NSAM1=TGT4SAM
GOSUB 1610:TGT4SAM=NSAM1:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
NFROM=4:GOSUB 1840: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT4=TGT: IF MARK = 1 THEN RETURN
IF TGT4=0 THEN RETURN
IF TGT4=1 THEN GOTO 3740
3 8 50 RETURN
3860 ' S3: (WHEN ALL THE OTHER THREE TGTS WERE KILLED, TGT3
' LEFT)
NOTE:
THERE ARE THREE CASES FOR NODE 3:
1. NODE 1234 —> NODE 34 — > NODE 3.
2. NODE 1234 —> NODE 234 — > NODE 34
— > NODE 3.
3. NODE 1234 — > NODE 134 —> NODE 34
—> NODE 3.
BECAUSE TGT3 HAS ALREADY BEEN TRACKED BY FCR,




'1234-234-34-3 (NEED TO BE CAREFUL IN DECIDING THE VALUE OF
»T. SEE NEXT LINE
IF KUM=1 AND NFROM=3 4 THEN : T=TP: GOTO 4 090
IF T >= TP THEN T=TP
4090 TGT3SAM=TGT3SAM+1
NSAM1=TGT3SAM
GOSUB 1610 :TGT3SAM=NSAMI: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
NFROM=3: GOSUB 184 0: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT3=TGT:IF MARK=1 THEN RETURN
IF TGT3=0 THEN RETURN
IF TGT3=1 THEN GOTO 4090
4190 RETURN
4200 'S2: TGT2 LEFT ONLY.
" THIS CASE WOULD HAPPEN ONLY FROM NODE 24. NO
' REACTION TIME NECESSARY.
FLAG=0: WHERE=2
IF NFROM=2 3 4 AND MARK=1 THEN
IF TGT2=1 THEN T=TP:GOTO 4270
IF TGT2=0 THEN GOSUB 3 58 0: RETURN
END IF
IF NFROM=24 AND MARK=1 THEN T=TP




GOSUB 1610:TGT2SAM=NSAM1:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
NFROM=2:GOSUB 184 0: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT2=TGT:IF MARK=1 THEN RETURN
IF TGT2= THEN RETURN
IF TGT2=1 THEN GOTO 4270
437 RETURN
4380 'SI: TGT1 LEFT ONLY
•NO REACTION TIME NECESSARY
FLAG=0: WHERE=1
IF T >= TP THEN T=TP
4440 TGT1SAM=TGT1SAM+1
NSAM1=TGT1SAM
GOSUB 1610:TGT1SAM=NSAM1:IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
NFROM=l: GOSUB 184 0: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT1=TGT:IF MARK=1 THEN RETURN
IF TGT1=0 THEN RETURN
IF TGT1=1 THEN GOTO 4440
4 54 RETURN
4550 'S14:(FCR2 KILLED TGT2 AND TGT3 ,AND NOW SHIFTS TO TGT4
,












GOSUB 1470 : TGT1SAM=NSAM1 : TGT4SAM=NSAM2 : IF FLAG=1 THEN
RETURN
IF TGT2SUC=1 THEN
MARK=1: GOSUB 184 : TGT1=TGT: GOSUB 4 380: RETURN
END IF
NFROM=14: GOSUB 169 0: IF FLAG=1 THEN RETURN
TGT1=TGTA
TGT2=TGTB
IF TGT1=1 AND TGT4=1 THEN
IF TGT1=1 AND TGT4=0 THEN
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT4=1 THEN
IF TGT1=0 AND TGT4=0 THEN









•TOTALSAM: TOTAL SAMS HAVE BEEN FIRED FROM THE N SAMPLE SIZE
•NSAM # OF MISSILES THAT CAN BE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE INCOMING
1 TARGETS
•EK: EXPECTED NUMBER OF TARGETS BEING KILLED.
»SS: SHIP SURVIVABILITY AGAINST 4 TARGETS.
'ESA: EXPECTED # OF DEFENSE SUCCESSFULLY.
'SA: THE # OF SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE.
BG(I / J,K)=TGTKILLED TGTs ARE KILLED BY SAM
LEAKTHRU(I,J,K)=TLEAK 'TGTs GET THRU THE SAM DEFENSE
DEFFAIL(I,J,K)=HIT 'AT LEAST ONE TGT IMPACTS SHIP
BYCIWS ( I , J , K) =GOODCIWS
TOTALSAM=SAMPTGT1+SAMPTGT2+SAMPTGT3+SAMPTGT4
TM ( I , J , K) =TOTALSAM
'TOTALSAM: TOTAL SAM THE SHIP HAS FIRED AT THE INBOUND TGTs
LEAKTHRU ( I , J , K) =TLEAK
ESI ( I , J , K) =LEAKTHRU ( I , J , K) /N
NS ( I , J , K) =TOTALSAM/N
EK ( I , J , K) =TGTKILLED/N
SS(I,J,K)=1-(HIT/N)
ESA ( I , J , K) =SA ( I , J , K) /N
CIWSKILL ( I , J , K) =BYCIWS ( I , J , K) /N
TOTALEK ( I , J , K) = ( TGTKILLED+GOODCIWS ) /N
5000 RETURN
CIWS:
•IN ORDER FOR THE MAX INTERCEPT RANGE IS 2NM WHICH TAKES TGTS
'12 SECONDS TO FLY








IF CIWSDTGT < CIWSDTGTP THEN CIWSDTGT=CIWSDTGTP: CIWST=CIWSTP
CIWSSTARTT=(CIWSDTGT-MI) *6+CIWST 'CIWSSTARTT: THE TIME THE
'CIWS MODE STARTED
IF CIWSDTGT >= 3 THEN '3 NM=(5 SEC) * ( 1/6) (NM/SEC) +2NM
CIWST=(CIWSDTGT-3) *6+CIWST '5 SEC IS THE CIWS REACTION
•TIME
END IF
'REACTION AND START FIRING THE CIWS:
CIWST=CIWST+CIWSRT 'THE TIME CIWS FIRE BY ADDING THE REACTION
•TIME




IF CIWSDTGT <= 0.1 OR DIFF <= .6 THEN OUCH=l: GOTO 5020
•FIRING:
GOSUB SEEKPK
CIWST=CIWST+CONTFIRET 'THE CIWST HERE IS THE
'TIME TO CHECK PK
CIWSDTGT=RANGE-CIWST/6
GOSUB CIWSSUB1
IF CIWSDTGT <= 0.1 THEN OUCH=l: GOTO 502
IF TGT=1 THEN GOTO 5010
502 IF NFROM=12 34 OR NFROM=13 4 OR NFROM=2 34 THEN OUCH=l
RETURN
CIWSSUB1:
•THE CIWS WILL BE ON AT THE ONE WHO HAS BEEN PROCESSED BY THE
•SAM FIRST ALREADY
IF RANGE <= 10 AND NFROM=1234 THEN
TGTT$="TGT2"
TGT=TGT2
END IF :GOTO 6000
IF NFROM=12 3 4 THEN TGT=TGT1
IF NFROM=134 THEN TGT=TGT1
IF NFROM=2 3 4 THEN TGT=TGT2
IF NFROM=34 THEN TGT=TGT3
IF NFROM=14 THEN TGT=TGT1
IF NFROM=2 4 THEN TGT=TGT2
IF NFROM=l THEN TGT=TGT1
IF NFROM=2 THEN TGT=TGT2
IF NFROM=3 THEN TGT=TGT3































































IF DIFF > 8.6 THEN CIWSPK=0.6 :C0NTFIRET=8
'8.6 SEC BECAUSE OF INCLUDING THE 0.1 NM OF THE MIN INTERCEPT
'RANGE
.6 AND DIFF <= 8 . 6 THEN CIWSPK=. 05*CONTFIRET+ . 2
6 AND DIFF <= 6 . 6 THEN CIWSPK=. l*CONTFIRET- .
1
6 AND DIFF <= 4 . 6 THEN CIWSPK=. 075*CONTFIRET
IF DIFF > 6
IF DIFF > 4,






Simultaneous SSMs attack (spacing = 0)
pk=0.3, state 1:
SAM DEFENSE RESULT
RT RANGE Ef#SAM1 SS EKTSSM1 ETLEAK1 SS
30 30 6.14 0.01 1.74 2.26 0.01
30 25 5.57 0.01 1.47 2.53 0.01
30 20 3.82 0.00 1.14 2.86 0.00
30 15 2.91 0.00 0.81 3.19 0.00
30 10 1.00 0.00 0.30 3.70 0.00
pk=0.3. state 2:
SAM DEFENSE RESULT
RT RANGE ET#SAM1 SS EKTSSM1 EfLEAKl SS
20 30 6.59 0.03 1.81 2.19 0.03
20 25 5.65 0.01 1.64 2.36 0.01
20 20 4.79 0.00 1.30 2.70 0.00
20 15 3.82 0.00 0.60 3.40 0.00




RT RANGE E("#SAM1 SS EKTSSM1 EfLEAKl SS
20 30 5.98 0.19 2.71 1.29 0.19
20 25 5.20 0.08 2.47 1.53 0.08
20 20 4.50 0.00 1.90 2.10 0.00
20 15 3.50 0.00 0.99 3.01 0.00
20 10 2.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 0.00
pk=0.7, state 4 and state 5;
SAM DEFENSE CIWS DEFENSE RE£
1 EKTSSM1 ETLEAI
3ULT
RT RANGE ET#SAM 1 SS EKTSSM1 E T LEAK q ss
20 30 5.24 0.47 3.35 0.65 0.35 0.3 0.75
20 25 4.69 0.26 3.09 0.91 0.50 0.42 0.65
20 20 4.21 0.00 2.21 1.79 0.65 1.14 0.18
20 15 3.02 0.00 1.40 2.60 0.65 1.95 0.00
20 10 2.00 0.00 1.40 2.60 0.66 1.94 0.00
78
Sequential SSMs attack (spacing = 5 seconds)
SAM DEFENSE
RT RANGE Ef#SAM1 SS EKfSSMI EfLEAK]
20 30 5.24 0.63 3.55 0.45
20 25 5.02 0.36 3.15 0.85
20 20 4.18 0.24 2.85 1.15
20 15 3.79 0.00 1.54 2.46
20 10 2.00 0.00 1.40 2.60









Sequential SSMs attack (spacing = 10 seconds)
SAM DEFENSE CIWS DEFENSE RESULT
RT RANGE E("#SAM1 SS EKfSSMI ETLEAKl EKfSSMI EfLEAKl SS
20 30 5.49 0.65 3.57 0.43 0.23 0.20 0.84
20 25 5.17 0.64 3.54 0.46 0.24 0.21 0.83
20 20 4.94 0.31 2.96 1.04 0.44 0.60 0.58
20 15 4.00 0.00 1.40 2.60 0.67 1.93 0.00
20 10 2.00 0.00 1.40 2.60 0.67 1.93 0.00
79
Sequential SSMs attack (spacing = 15 seconds)
SAM DEFENSE CIWS DEFENSE RES
EKTSSMl El" LEAK!
;ult
RT RANGE ET#SAM1 SS EK("SSM1 El" LEAK 1 SS
20 30 5.53 0.71 3.65 0.35 0.19 0.16 0.87
20 25 5.29 0.65 3.55 0.45 0.24 0.21 0.83
20 20 5.11 0.45 3.21 0.79 0.35 0.44 0.71
20 15 4.15 0.24 2.37 1.63 0.49 1.13 0.44




The maximum intercept range is two NMs.
The minimum intercept range is 0.1 NMs.
The reaction time of CIWS is five seconds
The fire rate is 30 rounds per second.
The assessment time is two seconds.
The total ammunition is 1200 rounds.
81
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